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Hedrick v. Warden
570 S.E.2d 840 (Va. 2002)

I. Facts
On May 10, 1997, Brandon Wayne Hedrick ("Hedrick") and Trevor Jones
("Jones") drove to an area in Lynchburg to find prostitutes. Hedrick and Jones
met two prostitutes and the four went to Jones's apartment to engage in sexual
relations and smoke crack cocaine. Thereafter, Hedrick and Jones brought the
prostitutes back to the area and met two other prostitutes and returned to Jones'
apartment to smoke marijuana, drink bourbon and engage in sexual relations.
Hedrick and Jones drove these women back and Jones saw Lisa Yvonne Alexander Crider ("Crider").'
Hedrick and Jones, knowing that Crider's boyfriend sold crack cocaine,
picked up Crider to have sexual relations with her and rob her of any crack
cocaine she had in her possession.2 Jones asked Crider if she wanted to have
sex.3 Hedrick, Jones and Crider drove to Jones's apartment where Jones paid
Crider fifty dollars to have sexual intercourse.4 After intercourse, Jones and5
Hedrick created a plan in which Hedrick would pretend to rob Jones and Crider.
Jones instructed Hedrick to retrieve Jones's shotgun from the truck.6 Hedrick
entered the apartment, pumped the shotgun and signaled to Jones and Crider to
go into a bedroom.' Hedrick directed Jones to empty Crider's pockets.8 Among
other things, Jones took the fifty dollar bill he paid Crider earlier.9 Jones
handcuffed Crider, duct taped her eyes and mouth, and placed a shirt over her
face.' ° Hedrick took Crider to the truck." Hedrick, Jones and Crider left the
apartment around 1:00 am. 2 Hedrick and Crider sat in the back seat while Jones

1.
2.
3.

Hedrick v. Warden, 570 S.E.2d 840, 846 (Va. 2002).
Id.
Id.

4.

Id.

5.

Id.

6.

Id.

7.

Hedrik, 570 S.E.2d at 846.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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drove. 3 Hedrick removed the duct tape from Crider." Jones stopped driving
and got out of the truck while Hedrick raped Crider. 5
Hedrick and Jones decided to kill Crider to avoid retaliation from Crider's'
boyfriend. Jones drove around to find a suitable location to commit the murder.
Crider cried and pleaded for her life. She asked if there was anything she could
do to prevent them from killing her. Hedrick replied that he would think about
it if she would perform oral sex, which she did. In the morning, Jones drove to
an area near the James River where the two men removed the handcuffs and
duct taped Crider's hands together. They took Crider to the river and Jones
positioned her so that her back was to the river. Hedrick shot Crider in the face
with the shotgun. 6
Hedrick was convicted of the capital murder of Crider in the commission
of forcible sodomy, rape and robbery in violation of Virginia Code Sections 18.231(5) and 18.2-31(4); "robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58; rape in violation
of Code § 18.2-61; forcible sodomy in violation of Code § 18.2-67.1; abduction
in violation of Code § 18.2-47; and use of a firearm in the commission of a
murder in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.' ' The jury fixed the sentences for the
non-capital crimes according to the appropriate statutory ranges and fixed the
punishment for the capital crimes at death.'8 The circuit court sentenced Hedrick according to the jury's recommendations and the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in Hedrick v. Commonwealth.' 9
Hedrick filed a petition for habeas relief alleging that his trial counsel were
ineffective. The Supreme Court of Virginia ordered the Circuit Court of Appomattox County to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether
Hedrick was denied effective assistance of counsel. At the evidentiary hearing,
13.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 846.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.at 846-47.
17.
Id.at 845; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(5) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder
as "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of, or
subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object
sexual penetration"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(4) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining "[t]he willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or attempted
robbery" as capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58 (Michie 1996) (describing punishment for
robbery); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining what constitutes rape and the
punishment for such a crime); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.1 (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining what
constitutes forcible sodomy and the punishment for such a crime); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-47
(Michie Supp. 2002) (defining abduction and kidnapping and describing punishment); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Michie 1996) (defining when it is unlawful to use or display firearm in committing felony).
18.
Hedick, 570 S.E.2d at 845.
19.
Id.; Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 634 (Va. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 952
(1999) (holding that there was no reversible error found in trial court's decision); see Kelly E.P.
Bennett, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 429 (1999) (analyzing Hedrick v. Commonwealth, Nos. 982055, 98-2056, 1999 WL 101079 (Va. Feb. 26, 1999)).
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the circuit court concluded that Hedrick's allegations lacked merit. While
Hedrick's petition was pending, he wrote numerous letters regarding his inability
to decide whether to pursue the habeas petition. The circuit court decided that
Hedrick did desire to pursue the petition. The Supreme Court of Virginia
determined that the circuit court's conclusions of law involved mixed questions
20
of fact and law and were therefore subject to its de novo review.
In this habeas proceeding, Hedrick claimed that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Hedrick's claims of ineffectiveness included allegations
that trial counsel: (1) failed to communicate with each other; (2) failed to investigate Hedrick's background and failed to prepare for trial; (3) failed to pursue an
accidental shooting defense; (4) failed to develop a voluntary intoxication defense; (5) made errors affecting the penalty phase of the capital murder trial; (6)
did not present evidence of Hedrick's remorse and cooperation; (7) did not
cross-examine Jones effectively and failed to cross-examine law enforcement
officers; (8) did not advise Hedrick not to testify at the capital murder trial due
to his emotional immaturity and intellectual limitations; (9) failed to object to the
testimony of the victim's grandmother; (10) failed to object to the Commonwealth's Attorney's closing argument; (11) failed to object to venue; (12) failed
to make a motion for a change of venue when members of the venire were
exposed to media coverage about the case; (13) failed to conduct an adequate
voir dire of the jury; (14) failed to advise him regarding a statement he made to
the police after his arrest; (15) failed to request various jury instructions; and (16)
failed to preserve and argue meritorious issues on appeal.2'
20.

Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 845-47. While Hedrick's petition for habeas corpus was pending,

he forwarded a notarized letter requesting permission to withdraw his petition. Id. at 845. The next
day, however, Hedrick wrote another letter stating that his attorneys were not acting according to
his wishes and that their beliefs regarding capital punishment conflicted with his own. Id. Hedrick

stated that he is a religious man who believed that he should be punished with death for his crime
but his attorneys opposed the death penalty. Id. Subsequently, Hedrick forwarded another letter
prepared by his attorneys stating that he wished to proceed with his habeas corpus petition. Id.
at
846. The Supreme Court of Virginia entered an order instructing the circuit court to hold another

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Hedrick wanted to proceed with his petition. Id.The
circuit court concluded that Hedrick did desire to continue with the petition and that this was his
final decision on the matter. Id. If the circuit court reached the opposite result, that Hedrick did
not wish to continue his habeas petition, then additional procedures would be required. See also

Ross E. Eisenberg, The Lanyer's Role When the Defendant Seeks Death, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 55, 56 (2001)
(examining "the ethical and professional obligations of the attorney whose client pleads guilty and
asks for death").
21. Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 848-62. Hedrick made two other claims. Id. at 862. Hedrick
asserted that the circuit court erred by refusing to allow his habeas corpus counsel to inspect the
Commonwealth's Attorney's files. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Hedrick
could not expand the scope of the court's order directing the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing only on the issues raised in Claim I of the habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. Claim I of Hedrick's petition did not include issues regarding the
Commonwealth's Attorney's files or trial counsel's access to such files. Id. Hedrick also claimed
that the Commonwealth failed to disclose favorable information to him in violation of Brad v.
Magyland. Id.; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding "that the suppression by the
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II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the circuit court properly applied22
the two-pronged test of ineffectiveness established by Strickland v. Washington.
Agreeing with the circuit court that Hedrick's claims were all without merit, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the alleged deficiencies in trial counsel's
assistance did not constitute ineffective assistance.' The court dismissed the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.24
III. Analysis
The court relied on the established legal principles of Stricklandto determine
whether Hedrick's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel had merit.2" Under
Strickland, a two-pronged test must be satisfied to prevail on an ineffective
assistance claim.26 The defendant must show that counsel's performance was so
greatly lacking that the defendant did not receive a reasonable standard of care
and competence guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.2" If the defendant can
show deficient performance, the defendant must also demonstrate that the
deficient representation by counsel prejudiced the defense.28
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims require the defendant to prove
prejudice.29 The United States Supreme Court held in Strickland that the defendant must show that particular errors in counsel's performance had an actual
adverse effect on the defense.3" The Supreme Court of Virginia used the following test established by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether
the required prejudice existed:
The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome ....
When a
defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution'). The court held this claim to be procedurally defaulted because Hedrick did not
raise this claim in his opening brief. Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 862.
22.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 847; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (holding
that defendant must show counsel's deficient performance and that performance prejudiced
defense before sentence or conviction will be overturned).
23.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 847, 862.

24.
25.

Id. at 862.
Id. at 847.

26.

Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.

27.
28.

Id.
Id.

29.

Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 847.

30.

Strickland,466 U.S. at 693.
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reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.3'
The court reiterated the United States Supreme Court's decision that Strickland's
standard is "highly demanding."32
A. Communication
Hedrick contended that the main issue in this case was that trial counsel
were ineffective because they failed to communicate with him regarding a
strategy, witnesses and witness testimony.33 The circuit court concluded that this
claim was without merit and the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed.34 Lee R.
Harrison ("Harrison") and James P. Baber ("Baber") were Hedrick's trial
counsel. 35 At the evidentiary hearing, Harrison testified that a communication
problem occurred only on one occasion when Baber did not give certain information to Harrison promptly.36 Harrison remedied the situation by retrieving a
copy of the material needed from Baber's office.37 Trial counsel also testified
that although they did not meet at one another's offices, they did meet at other
locations to discuss the case.38 Harrison prepared the expert witnesses and Baber
located lay witnesses while collecting information about Hedrick's background.39
The evidentiary hearing report revealed that trial counsel provided the mental
health expert witness with the information Baber collected and materials given
by the Commonwealth.' Based on the evidentiary hearing report submitted by
the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick's allegation
that trial counsel failed to communicate
did not pass the performance and
41
prejudice test established in Strickland.
B. Investigation and Preparation for Trial
Hedrick further argued that trial counsel neither investigated nor adequately
prepared for trial.42 Hedrick alleged that counsel did not discuss his background
with his friends or relatives and did not speak with witnesses prior to the wit-

31.
32.
33.
34.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 848 (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986)).
Id.
Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.
38.

Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 848.

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nesses' testimony during the sentencing hearing.43 Hedrick also asserted that the
mental health expert, Dr. Gary Hawk ("Hawk"), urged counsel to contact
Hedrick's friends, family members or other individuals regarding Hedrick's
background and that trial counsel did not do so.' Hedrick claimed that trial
counsel failed to obtain his school records that indicated his " 'borderline'
intellectual abilities" and that they failed to obtain an expert witness to advise
them in scientific areas.45
The circuit court rejected Hedrick's allegations.46 The circuit court found
that trial counsel researched legal issues, prepared and filed motions and reviewed extensive discovery provided by the Commonwealth.47 Trial counsel also
collected background information, contacted Hedrick's friends and family and
attempted to obtain Hedrick's school records. 48 The circuit court found that trial
counsel met with various expert witnesses, including Hawk, and discussed the
case with Hedrick numerous times before the trial. 49 Based on the circuit court's
findings, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick's allegation that trial
counsel failed to investigate and prepare adequately for trial did not pass the
performance and prejudice test established in Strickland."°
C. Guilt Phase Theories
Hedrick argued that trial counsel failed to develop guilt phase theories,
specifically arguing that Baber and Harrison did not reconcile their differences
regarding a possible theory that Hedrick accidentally shot Crider.5 Hedrick also
argued that trial counsel failed to procure an expert witness to help the development of this theory.52 Hedrick asserted that
the Commonwealth's medical
53
examiner had evidence supporting this theory.
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this allegation based on the circuit
court's report stating that the jury was presented with testimony that Hedrick
attempted to shoot above Crider's head "to scare her."54 However, the Commonwealth's evidence demonstrated that the shooting took place at a distance of
three to seven feet from Crider's mouth. 55 The evidence also established that
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 848-49.
Id.
at 849.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 849.
Id.
at 848-49.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 849.
Id.

52.

Id.
at 850.

53.
54.

Id.
Id.

55.

Id.
at 848-49.
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Special Agent Holt ("Holt") initially suggested the accidental shooting theory to
minimize Hedrick's involvement.5 6 Hedrick admitted in his judicial admission
filed with the Supreme Court of Virginia that he was guilty of the crimes
charged. 7 Therefore, the court held that Hedrick's argument failed to satisfy the
5
performance and prejudice standards of Strickland."
D. Voluntary Intoxication
Hedrick asserted that because he was under the influence of marijuana he
was not aware of his actions and did not have a "clear mind." 9 Hedrick claimed
that trial counsel did not develop evidence of voluntary intoxication as a
defense.' The circuit court found that trial counsel did present evidence regarding Hedrick's drug and alcohol abuse and his intoxication on the night before the
murder.6'
The quantities of drugs and alcohol that Hedrick consumed were not
known and the circuit court found that a minimum of five hours lapsed between
the time Hedrick ingested alcohol or drugs and the time of the shooting.62 Also,
the evidence at trial portrayed someone who was neither intoxicated nor impaired.63 The evidence demonstrated that the conduct ofJones and Hedrick was
both purposeful and planned.64 Based on the facts presented at trial and defense
counsel's presentation of evidence of drug and alcohol consumption, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick's claims failed to satisfy the performance or prejudice standards of Strickland.6
E. ErrorsAffecting Penaly Phase
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel made numerous errors during the penalty
phase of the capital murder trial.66 Hedrick argued that counsel did not conduct
a "meaningful... investigation" and asserted that "[t]hey made only the most
superficial effort to collect records concerning .

.

. [his] background."67

He

56.
Hednck, 570 S.E.2d at 850.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 850. Hedrick also argued that trial counsel failed to proffer a jury instruction on
voluntary intoxication. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. The court relied on the circuit
court's observation that the evidence" 'did not depict [petitioner] as someone who was significantly
intoxicated and impaired.'" Id. at 851.
62. Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 851.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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alleged that trial counsel did not interview people regarding his background and
did not subpeona any witnesses nor speak to the witnesses about their testimony
prior to the trial.68 Hedrick claimed that his family members could have described a "chaotic and often violent environment in which... [he] grew up."69
Hedick also asserted that trial counsel failed sufficiently to use Hawk, whose
expert report cited Hedrick's parents' substance abuse.7"
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick's claims lacked merit.7
According to the circuit court's report, trial counsel met with Hawk to prepare
for the capital murder trial and Hawk conducted interviews with Hedrick's
mother and brother.72 Hawk informed trial counsel of mitigating factors he
identified such as Hedrick's inferior intellect, drug and alcohol abuse, and
depression.7" With regard to Hedrick's claim that trial counsel did not present
evidence of Hedrick's "chaotic" family environment, the circuit court found that
Hedrick instructed his attorneys not to present evidence of a" 'bad childhood.'
,74 The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that Hedrick could not assert in a
subsequent habeas corpus petition that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's
conduct because they followed his instructions.7"
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that trial counsel presented evidence
that Hedrick ingested alcohol and drugs on the evening prior to the murder.76
However, nobody knew the quantity of substances Hedrick consumed.77
Hedrick's expert witnesses could not opine that Hedrick was intoxicated to such
a degree that he was unable to "form an intent to commit a specific act."7" The
Supreme Court of Virginia found that Hedrick was not prejudiced by trial counsel's conduct because the evidence on the record demonstrated that he deliberately developed and implemented the plan to rob and kill Crider. 9 The court
held that Hedrick's arguments did not satisfy the performance and prejudice
requirements established in Strickland.8"

68.

Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 851.

69.
70.

Id. at 852.
Id. at 851-52.
Id. at 852.

71.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Hedrck,570 S.E.2d at 852. During Hedrick's sentencing hearing, his family testified that
he was raised in a "normal" family, was not abused and was taught right from wrong. Id.at 852.
75.
Id.

76.
77.

Id.
at 853.
Id.

78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 853.
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F. Remorse and Cooperation
Hedrick argued that trial counsel did not adequately present evidence of his
remorse for his acts and his cooperation with police officers in making statements regarding Crider's death.8' Hedrick asserted that trial counsel neither
questioned Hedrick's spiritual counselor about his remorse nor used jail records
stating that he expressed "extreme shame, remorse, [and] pessimism."82 Hedrick
also claimed that trial counsel failed to question Jones before or during the trial
regarding Hedrick's reaction to the crimes committed.83
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick's claims were without
merit because trial counsel presented evidence of Hedrick's cooperation with
police officers.' Moreover, trial counsel presented witnesses who testified to
Hedrick's remorse.85 The circuit court also stated that Hedrick's testimony did
not demonstrate remorse for the victim. 6 Based on this report, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that Hedrick failed to satisfy the performance and prejudice standards of Strickland."
G. Cross-Examination
1. Jones
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel failed to cross-examine Jones adequately.88 Hedrick argued that although trial counsel knew ofJones's bias against
Hedrick, trial counsel did not elicit such bias.89 Hedrick also claimed that Baber
did not impeach Jones regarding inconsistent statements he made to police
officers and did not question Jones adequately about his felony convictions.'
Hedrick argued that trial counsel did not question Jones regarding the offers of
leniency made by the Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony.9
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the circuit court's conclusion
that these assertions lacked merit.9 The circuit court accepted that trial counsel
made tactical decisions regarding the cross-examination of Jones and the determination to emphasize thatJones led the crimes.93 The Supreme Court of Virginia
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 853-54.
Id.at 854.
Id.
at 855.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 855.
Id.
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held that Hedrick did not show that he was prejudiced as a result of the alleged
deficiencies in the cross-examination ofJones.94 The court held that Hedrick did
not satisfy the performance and prejudice requirements established in Strickland.95
The court also agreed with the circuit court's finding that trial counsel were
not ineffective in failing to question Jones about the alleged offer of leniency.96
During the habeas evidentiary hearing, the Commonwealth's Attorney testified
against the validity of the allegation." The Supreme Court of Virginia held that
Hedrick failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the fact that trial
counsel did not question Jones about his purported bias against him and that he
did not demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would have been different if this testimony was elicited.98 Further, the
court stated that given Hedrick's judicial admission of guilt, he could not have
been prejudiced.99
2. Police Officers
Hedrick argued that trial counsel failed to cross-examine police officers.' 0
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel did not challenge the Commonwealth's
argument that Holt created the accidental shooting theory to trick Hedrick into
confessing to the killing. 1 ' Hedrick asserted that an adequate cross-examination
of Holt would have demonstrated that his testimony was inconsistent with notes
written by both Holt and Deputy Sheriff Williamson ('Williamson") suggesting
that the accidental shooting theory did not originate with Holt but with
Hedrick.' Hedrick
argued that trial counsel failed to demonstrate this conflict
03
to the jury.
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the circuit court's conclusion
that further cross-examination of both Holt and Williamson "would not have led
to a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different."'0 4 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick did not demonstrate
prejudice because he admitted his guilt to the police officers.'0 5 Thus, the court
94.
95.

Id.
Id.

96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Hedtick, 570 S.E.2d

98.
at 855-56; see Strickland,466 U.S. at 694-95 (requiring defendant to
"show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different").
99. Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 856.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.at 856-57.
103.
Id.at 857.
104.
Id.

105.

Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 857.
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held that Hedrick did not satisfy the prejudice and performance standards of the
Strickland test."°
H. Advice RegardingHedrick sTestimony
Hedrick argued that trial counsel failed to advise him not to testify at the
capital murder trial given his "intellectual limitations and emotional immaturity.' 0 7 Hedrick also claimed that trial counsel did not prepare him for trial and
failed to rehabilitate him after a poor performance during cross-examination. 1°
The Supreme Court of Virginia found these claims to lack merit because of the
circuit court's report that trial counsel were aware of Hedrick's ability to relate
his version of events regarding the crimes."° The report stated that both Harrison and Baber testified that Hedrick wanted to tell his version of the story." 0
The circuit court also noted in the report that trial counsel "repeatedly" reviewed
Hedrick's version of the events with him and discussed with him the inconsistencies in his story."' The circuit court stated that trial counsel could not have
rehabilitated Hedrick on cross-examination and therefore elected to remove him
from the stand." 2 Based on these findings, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that Hedrick did not satisfy the performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland test."3

I. Viim's Grandmother
Hedrick argued that trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of
Crider's grandmother, Edna Alexander ("Alexander')." 4 Alexander identified a
picture of Crider's son and detailed the events that occurred on the day before
Crider's death."' The circuit court found that trial counsel made a tactical
decision not to object believing that the information was not likely to cause
prejudice to Hedrick and permitted trial counsel to cross-examine Alexander
about her knowledge that Crider was a prostitute and sold drugs." 6 The Supreme
Court of Virginia agreed with the circuit court and held that Hedrick failed to
satisfy the performance and prejudice requirements established by Strickland."7

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 857.
Id.
Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 857.
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J. Commonwealth's Closing Argument
Hedrick argued that trial counsel were ineffective because they did not
object to the Commonwealth's Attorney's closing argument.1 8 During closing
argument, trial counsel argued that Hedrick was only guilty of manslaughter and
suggested that Crider was killed accidentally." 9 In rebuttal, the Commonwealth's
Attorney stated that the case was not about manslaughter and that Hedrick was
guilty.2 Additionally, the Commonwealth's Attorney stated, "[n]ot guilty means
he gets to walk right out
that door ....That's not what this case is about. It's
12
about capital murder.' '
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that even assuming trial counsel
should have objected, Hedrick did not establish prejudice.' 22 Agreeing with the
circuit court, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained that the jury knew about
Hedrick's other convictions and that he would not have been released from
prison if the jury did not convict him of capital murder. 3 Therefore, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick
did not satisfy the performance and
124
prejudice requirements of Strickland.
K Venue
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to
object to venue. 2 Hedrick argued that venue for this case "was not proved on
the substantive charges of forcible sodomy and rape.' 1 6 The circuit court stated
2
in its report that the murder of Crider occurred in Appomattox County.1'
The
Supreme Court of Virginia stated that venue "was proper for all the capital
murder indictments in Appomattox County, regardless of where the underlying
offenses occurred.' 1 8 The court held that Hedrick did not satisfy the performance and prejudice standards established in Strickland.'29

118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 857.
124.
Id. at 857-58.
125.
Id. at 858.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-244 (Michie 2000) (stating that, "as otherwise provided by
law, the prosecution of a criminal case shall be had in the county or city in which the offense was
committed"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-247 (Michie Supp. 2002) (stating that for capital murder, "the
offense may be prosecuted in any jurisdiction in the Commonwealth in which any one of the
killings may be prosecuted").
129.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 858.

2003]

HEDRICK V WARDEN

L Media Coverage and Change of Venue
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel were ineffective because of a failure to
move for a change of venue when venire members were exposed to media
coverage on the case. 3 ° Hedrick based this argument on newspaper articles that
detailed the crime and included his confession to the crimes."' The circuit
court's report stated that the articles could not have affected the jury because the
articles were "routine" and an "accurate coverage of events."' 32 The jurors
assured the trial court that they could set aside any outside information they
acquired about the case and that they would base their decision only on the
evidence presented at trial.'33 The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that trial
counsel had no basis on which to file the motion and that Hedrick failed to
34
satisfy the performance and prejudice standards established in Strickland'
Therefore, this claim was determined to be without merit. 35
M. Voir Dire
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate voir dire
of the jury by failing to ask members of the venire what they read or heard about
the case and what effect this information had on their abilities to be a juror.'36
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Hedrick's argument lacked merit
because the record of the capital murder trial demonstrated that trial counsel
conducted a voir dire of prospective jurors and successfully removed certain
jurors for cause.'37 The court held that Hedrick's claim failed to satisfy the
performance and prejudice standards established by Strickland.3
N. Statements to Police Officer
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel were ineffective because of a failure to
39
adequately advise him concerning a statement he made to police officers.'
After Hedrick's first statement to the police, he feared the information Jones
would give and contacted his attorneys about his intention to make another
statement to the police."
According to Hedrick, Baber stated that another
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 858.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.at 859.
138.
Id.at 860.
139.
Id.Hedrick made his first statement to the police after his arrest and before trial counsel
were appointed. Id.
140.
Id.
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statement "could not hurt him" while Harrison stated that Hedrick should not
make another statement.'
Hedrick argued that trial counsel did not obtain
information that would allow them to give him competent advice, such as formu142
lating rules for the statement to the police before he made the second statement.
The circuit court reported that Harrison testified at the evidentiary hearing
that Hedrick stated that he would make the statement regardless of counsel's
presence. 3 The circuit court stated that counsel could not have been ineffective
because Hedrick "waived his right and submitted to questions by the police."'"
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the circuit court's conclusions and
held that Hedrick failed to satisfy the performance and prejudice standards
established by Strickland.'
0. Juy Instructions
1. Testimony ofAccomplice
Hedrick argued that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to
request a jury instruction informing the jury to accept the testimony of the
accomplice with "great caution."'' 46 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed,
stating that trial counsel were not required to request such an instruction because
cautionary accomplice instructions are granted when corroborative evidence is
lacking. 147 The circuit court reported that corroborative evidence was not lacking
at Hedrick's capital murder trial. 148 The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that
Hedrick did not show prejudice, particularly in light of Hedrick's judicial admission.149 The court further stated that Hedrick did not claim that corroboration
was needed "to support his conviction of capital murder during the commission
of robbery."' 5 ° Therefore, the court held that Hedrick failed to satisfy the
performance and prejudice standards of Strickland.''
2. Unanimousy and Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel were ineffective because they did not
request a jury instruction informing "the jury that it must find unanimously and
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 860.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 860.
Id. at 860-61.
Id.
at 861.
Id.
Id.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that... [Hedrick] forced Crider to commit either oral
sodomy, anal sodomy, or both before finding him guilty of forcible sodomy or
'
capital murder in the commission of a forcible sodomy."152
Hedrick argued that
the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict Hedrick more easily and "permitted the jury to make two alternate findings to prove the element of sod'
omy-anal penetration or oral penetration."153
Hedrick also contended that the
instructions did not require the jury to find unanimously that either act was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that regardless of whether trial
counsel were required to request such an instruction, Hedrick did not demonstrate any prejudice. The court stated that if Hedrick prevailed on his claim
concerning the forcible sodomy instruction, his "convictions for capital murder
in the commission of robbery and capital murder in the commission of a rape
would not be affected."' 5 The outcome would remain the same. Therefore, the
court held that Hedrick's claim did not satisfy the performance and prejudice
56
standards established iri
Strickland."
3. Vileness andAggravating Circumstance
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction requiring the jury unanimously to agree upon "the vileness aggravating circumstance."' 57 Hedrick argued that the vileness instruction that was submitted to the
jury posed a risk that Hedrick would be sentenced to death based upon the
vileness predicate even though the jury was split on whether his conduct demonstrated depravity of mind, aggravated battery, or acts of torture.5 8 The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that Hedrick failed to satisfy the prejudice requirement of
Strickland because in the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found that Hedrick
was "a continuing serious threat to society and that his offense was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or aggravated battery to the victim."' 59 Hedrick did not challenge the
future danger predicate and that finding alone was sufficient to impose a sentence of death. 6 '

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Hedtick, 570 S.E.2d at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 862.
Id.
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P. PreservationofMeritoriousIssues on Appeal
Hedrick claimed that trial counsel were deficient because they "failed to
preserve and argue meritorious issues on appeal. '1.6 Hedrick failed to present
any evidence on this issue during the evidentiary hearing.' 62 The Supreme Court
of Virginia held that Hedrick failed to satisfy the performance and prejudice
standards established in Strickland.'63

Q. Concurrence
The concurring justices agreed that Hedrick did not establish the "prejudice" prong of the two-part test established by the United States Supreme Court
in Strickland.'64 Defendants must satisfy the Stricklandtwo-part test demonstrating that trial counsel's performance was lacking and that such deficient performance resulted in prejudice. 6 ' The concurrence clarified that to satisfy the
"prejudice" prong, Hedrick needed to demonstrate that " 'but for counsel's
unprofessional errors,' " there was a reasonable probability that "the result of the
proceeding would have been different."' 66 The concurrence reiterated the
majority opinion's holding that Hedrick did not do this with any of his claims.'67
The concurrence noted that, as in Hedrick's case, when it is easier to dispose of
an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of insufficient prejudice, then that course
should be followed, rather than the longer analysis that the majority took.'68
IV. Application
As Hedrick shows, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are difficult to
prove. This case is a good example of what defendants must do in order to
prevail on such a claim. The court emphasized the importance of the "prejudice" prong and stated that a defendant only needs to show that a reasonable
probability exists that the case would have turned out differently but for counsel's deficient performance.' 69 In actuality, this standard is quite high. 7 ° Practi161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
166.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 862-63 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
167.
Id.
168.
Id; seealso Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d 648, 652 (Va. 1995) (stating that when
determining whether prejudice exists, the court must consider the totality of the evidence before
the jury or judge).
169.
Hedrick, 570 S.E.2d at 847.
170.
See Philip H. Yoon, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 427 (2003) (analyzing Woodford v.
Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002)); seegeneraly Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002) (implying
that state court opinions that include a citation to and analysis of Supreme Court opinions will
receive much deference).
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tioners should be aware, as the concurrence explains, that it is easier to dispose
of ineffective assistance claims based on a lack of sufficient prejudice, and when
this is the case, courts will often follow that simpler route.17' Practitioners must
be sure to demonstrate how the outcome of the case would have been different
if trial counsel did not commit unprofessional errors in evey instance of ineffective assistance. Thus, for each argument supporting the claim, practitioners must
establish both deficient performance and prejudice resulting from it.
1. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on the circuit court's report, held
that all of Hedrick's ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit and did
not demonstrate sufficient prejudice to prevail. Therefore, the court dismissed
Hedrick's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The concurring justices reiterated
what is necessary to satisfy the "prejudice" prong established in Strickland and
stated the simplicity of disposing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when
the defendant demonstrates insufficient prejudice as a result of the alleged
deficient performance.

V7. Epilogue
An April 3, 2003 execution date was set for Brandon Wayne Hedrick.'72
The Virginia Attorney General's Office reported that Hedrick withdrew his
federal habeas petition.'73 However, on April 2, 2003, Hedrick again made "a
final push" and asked for a stay of execution.'74 In the past, Hedrick's religious
convictions influenced his decision to die for his crime.'75 Most recently,
Hedrick believed that his death would only perpetuate emotional trauma in
Crider's family.'76 Hedrick asserted his remorse for the killing and wished to
engage in conversations with Crider's mother regarding the brutal murder.'77 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia granted Hedrick
a stay of execution.'78
Priya Nath
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